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Abstract. Consider a binary, monotone system of n independent compo-
nents having absolutely continuous lifetime distributions. The assessment of
the parameter vector, θ, of these distributions and hence of the reliability of
the system is often difficult due to scarcity of data. It is therefore important
to make use of all information in an efficient way. For instance, prior knowl-
edge is often of importance and can indeed conveniently be incorporated by
the Bayesian approach. It may also be important to continuously extract in-
formation from a system currently in operation. This may be useful both for
decisions concerning the system in operation as well as for decisions improving
the components or changing the design of similar new systems. As in Meilij-
son (1994) lifemonitoring of some components and conditional lifemonitoring
of some others is considered. In addition to data arising from this monitoring
scheme, so-called autopsy data are observed, if not censored. The probabilis-
tic structure underlying this kind of data is described and a basic likelihood
formula is arrived at. A thorough discussion of an important aspect of this
probabilistic structure, the inspection strategy, is given. Based on a version
of this strategy a procedure for preventive system maintenance is developed
and an application to a network system presented. All the way a Bayesian ap-
proach to estimation of θ is applied. For the case of exponentially distributed
component lifetimes it is shown that the weighted sum of products of general-
ized gamma distributions, as introduced in G˚asemyr & Natvig (1998), is the
conjugate prior for θ.
Key words: Marked point process; likelihood function; censoring; autopsy data; inspec-
tion function; component replacement; weighted sum of products of generalized gamma
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1 Introduction
Consider a binary, monotone system (E,φ), where E = {1, . . . , n} is the set of compo-
nents and φ is the structure function describing the state of the system in terms of the
binary states of the components. The system may be a technological one, or a human
being. We assume the components to be independent with absolutely continuous lifetime
distributions. Denote the lifetime of the system by T and the lifetime of the ith com-
ponent by Ti, with distribution function Fi(t), survival function F i(t) = 1 − Fi(t), p.d.f.
fi(t) and failure rate λi(t) = fi(t)/F i(t), i ∈ E. Introduce F (t) = (F 1(t), . . . , F n(t)).
The state of the ith component at time t is denoted Xi(t) and we have Xi(t)= I(Ti>t),
i ∈ E. Let X(t) = (X1(t), . . . , Xn(t)). We then have φ(X(t)) = I(T > t). The reliability
function, h(F (t)), of the system is given by h(F (t)) = Eφ(X(t)) = P (T > t).
The assessment of the parameter vector θ, of F (t) and hence of the reliability function
of the system is often difficult due to scarcity of data. It is therefore important to make use
of all information in an efficient way. For instance, prior knowledge is often of importance
and can indeed conveniently be incorporated by the Bayesian approach. It may also be
important to continuously extract information from a system currently in operation. This
may be useful both for decisions concerning the system in operation as well as for decisions
improving the components or changing the design of similar new systems.
The Bayesian inference on θ is based on computing the posterior distribution
pi(θ|D([0, t])), where D([0, t]) denotes data arising from observing the system in the
interval [0, t]. From Bayes theorem we have
pi(θ|D([0, t])) = pi0(θ)L(θ|D([0, t]))/
∫
pi0(θ)L(θ|D([0, t]))dθ , (1.1)
where pi0(θ) is the prior distribution and L(θ|D([0, t])) the likelihood function. When
the component state processes are only partially known, some care must be taken in the
computation of (1.1), even in our case of independent component processes. Such partial
knowledge may arise in practice due to financial and technological limitations.
We consider a monitoring scheme in which a subsetM = {1, . . . , p} of the components
is monitored from time 0 onwards, while the components in another subset C = {p +
1, . . . , p + q}, where 1 ≤ p < p + q ≤ n, are conditionally monitored, i.e. they are
monitored from certain time points τi onwards, i ∈ C. These time points are called
inspection times and are determined by the observed history of the system according to
a specific strategy determined in advance. For any component i for which Ti ≤ T , the
failure time is recorded if it is subject to monitoring at that time. In addition to data
arising from this monitoring scheme, we assume that if the system fails the set D of failed
components is identified through an autopsy. Data of this form has been considered
by Meilijson (1994) from the point of view of maximum likelihood estimation, and by
G˚asemyr (1998), who discusses the corresponding identifiability problem.
Some more terminology is needed. A path set P for the system is a set of components
which ensures the functioning of the system if all components in P are functioning. The
set P is called a minimal path set if no proper subset of P is a path set. A set K is a
cut set for the system if the system has failed when all components in K have failed. A
set A is a fatal set if P (D = A) > 0 where D = {i|Ti ≤ T}. We denote by A the set
{A1, . . . , Am} of fatal sets. For a fatal set A we denote by CA the critical set corresponding
2
to A, i.e. CA = {i ∈ A|P (Ti = T |D = A) > 0}, i.e. the set of components which could be
the direct cause of system failure if D = A. It is easy to see that CA = {i ∈ A|A− {i} is
not a cut set}.
In Section 2 of the present paper the probabilistic structure underlying the kind of
data we are considering, including a censoring mechanism, is described and a basic likeli-
hood formula is arrived at generalizing one given in Meilijson (1981). Section 3 is devoted
to a thorough discussion of an important aspect of this probabilistic structure, the inspec-
tion strategy. It is also shown that the likelihood and hence the posterior distribution
simplifies when applying a certain kind of inspection plan called cause-controlling. Based
on a version of this inspection plan a procedure for preventive system maintenance is
developed in Section 4 and an application to a network system presented. For the case of
exponentially distributed component lifetimes it is shown in Section 5 that the weighted
sum of products of generalized gamma distributions, as introduced in G˚asemyr & Natvig
(1998), is the conjugate prior for θ. In Appendix 1 we prove the likelihood formulae stated
in Section 2 and 4, whereas some further remarks on inspection strategies are given in
Appendix 2.
2 Basic probabilistic model and likelihood formula
A fundamental assumption in the present paper is that the inspection times are assumed to
occur immediately after the failure of a component that is currently being monitored. The
inspections are assumed to take zero operational time. The lifetimes T1, . . . , Tn along with
the inspection strategy determine an underlying process which is partially unobserved due
to censoring at the time of system failure. The following definitions are given inductively
due to the sequential nature of the set up.
Z∗0 = Z0 = 0, R0 =M, Q0 = ∅
Assume Rk−1 %= ∅.
Z∗k = min{Ti|i ∈ Rk−1} = the kth smallest lifetime among components being
monitored at the time of failure
I∗k = i if Z
∗
k = Ti
Hk = a subset of conditionally lifemonitored components in C − Rk−1 ∪ Qk−1
being monitored from Z∗k onwards, determined on the basis of information
that is or becomes available at Z∗k about components in M ∪ C
Hk,0 = {i ∈ Hk|Ti ≤ Z∗k} = the set of conditionally lifemonitored components
being failed on inspections at Z∗k
Hk,1 = {i ∈ Hk|Ti > Z∗k} = the set of conditionally lifemonitored components
being functioning on inspections at Z∗k
Rk = (Rk−1−I∗k)∪Hk,1 = the set of lifemonitored and conditionally lifemonitored
components being at risk (monitored and alive) just after Z∗k (2.1)
Qk = (Qk−1 ∪ I∗k) ∪Hk,0 = the set of lifemonitored and conditionally
lifemonitored components which just after Z∗k are known to have failed
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For i ∈ C
τ ∗i =
{
Z∗k if i ∈ Hk for some k
∞ otherwise
The observed data are determined by this underlying process through the following equa-
tions
Zk = Z
∗
k ∧ T
Ik =
{
I∗k if Zk = Z
∗
k
0 otherwise
Jk =
{
0 if Zk < T
j if (Zk = T ) ∩ (D = Aj), j ∈ {1, . . . ,m}
K ′ = min{k|Zk = T}
τi =
{
0 i ∈M
τ ∗i ∧ T i ∈ C
I = IK′ J = JK′
If Rk−1 = ∅, define
Z∗k =∞ , Hk = ∅ , Rk = Rk−1 = ∅ , Qk = Qk−1
It is convenient to summarize the information obtained from the inspections immediately
after Z∗k as a vector Y
∗
k = (Y
∗
k,p+1, . . . , Y
∗
k,p+q) ∈ {−1, 0, 1}q defined by
Y ∗k = (1Hk,1 ,0Hk,0 ,−1) ,
where the coordinates are 1 in the set Hk,1, 0 in the set Hk,0 and −1 otherwise. Hk,
Hk,0 and Hk,1 can be recovered from Y
∗
k by means of the functions G,G0, and G1 from
{−1, 0, 1}q into the set of subsets of C defined by
G(y) = {i ∈ C|yi %= −1}
G0(y) = {i ∈ C|yi = 0}
G1(y) = {i ∈ C|yi = 1}.
Also define
Y k =
{
Y ∗k if k < K
′
−1 if k = K ′ ,
reflecting that there is no additional inspection after the failure of the system since by
that time the autopsy data (T,D) are known.
Example 2.1 To illustrate the concepts consider a parallel system with set of components
E = {1, 2, 3}, M = {1} and C = {2, 3}. Assume that at the failure of component 1,
component 2 is inspected, and if it has failed component 3 is also inspected. Otherwise,
component 3 is inspected at T2. Then obviously τ1 = 0, τ2 = T1, τ3 = T1 ∨ T2. The
possible flow of events is given in Table 1.
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Table 1. Possible flow of events in a parallel system of three components
Ordering of lifetimes I1 Y 1 I2 Y 2 I3 Y 3 K ′ Y ∗K′
T1 < T2 < T3 1 (1,−1) 2 (−1, 1) 3 (−1,−1) 3 (−1,−1)
T1 < T2, T3 < T2 1 (1,−1) 2 (−1,−1) – – 2 (−1, 0)
T2 < T1 < T3 1 (0, 1) 3 (−1,−1) – – 2 (−1,−1)
T2 < T1, T3 < T1 1 (−1,−1) – – – – 1 (0, 0)
We denote by Bk the observed history up till and including Zk. Hence Bk is generated
by the variables Z1, I1,Y 1, J1, . . . , Zk, Ik,Y k, Jk. The information about the system ob-
tained at Zk is summarized as the vector (Ik,Y k, Jk), which can be considered as the mark
at Zk for a marked point process with Z1, . . . , ZK′ as the successive occurrence times. We
denote the corresponding intensities by ρi,y,j(t;Z1, I1,Y 1, . . . , Zk, Ik,Y k), Zk < t ≤ Zk+1.
A precise definition is given in Lemma A1.1 of Appendix 1. For k0 < K ′ we may then
write the likelihood for θ based on Bk0 as
L(θ|Bk0) = (2.2)
k0−1∏
k=0
{[P (Zk+1 > t|Bk)]t=Zk+1ρIk+1,Y k+1,Jk+1(Zk+1;Z1, I1,Y 1, . . . , Zk, Ik,Y k)} .
From this equation an explicit expression for the likelihood can be calculated. First,
however, we must consider the stochastic behaviour of the variables Y k+1. Note that if
∪kr=1[{I∗r } ∪Hr,0] ∪ {I∗k+1} is not a cut set, the system may or may not be down at Z∗k+1.
Hence the inspection strategy must be based on a scheme to be followed if the system is still
alive, i.e. if T > Z∗k+1 but which is not effectuated if the system is down. This scheme may
depend on all available information on the components at Z∗k+1. Accordingly, we define Ek
as the subhistory of Bk containing the same information as Bk except for information on
the state of the system, i.e. whether T > Z∗k or not. Thus Ek is generated by the variables
Z∗1 , I
∗
1 ,Y
∗
1, . . . , Z
∗
k , I
∗
k ,Y
∗
k. Given Ek, Z∗k+1 and I∗k+1, the available information on the
states of the components at Z∗k+1, only a certain subset Yk+1 ⊆ {−1, 0, 1}q of values for
Y ∗k+1 is possible as a consequence of the inspection scheme at Z
∗
k+1. For instance, Table 1
shows that in Example 2.1 the only possibilites for Y ∗1 are (1,−1), (0, 1) and (0, 0).
A convenient sufficient condition to establish our likelihood formula, turns out to be
given by the last equality to follow
lim
dt→0
P [Y ∗k+1 = y|Ek ∩ (t < Z∗k+1 ≤ t+ dt) ∩ (I∗k+1 = i)]
= lim
dt→0
P
[
Y ∗k+1 = y|Ek ∩ (t < Ti ≤ t+ dt) ∩
( ⋂
!∈Rk−{i}
(T! > Ti)
)]
=
∏
!∈G0(y)
F!(t)
∏
!∈G1(y)
F !(t) for y ∈ Yk+1 , (2.3)
and 0 otherwise. Note that unlike Bk, the subhistory Ek, does not contain any probabilistic
information on the states of the components in C − (Rk ∪Qk), i.e. these components are
conditionally independent with conditional lifetime distributions equal to the original
distributions. Hence, (2.3) is a very natural condition. Basically, (2.3) expresses a certain
stability in the inspection strategy, excluding measure theoretically pathological cases.
Some further comments on this are given in Appendix 2.
5
In order to include a censoring mechanism, suppose V > 0 is a censoring time, either
fixed in advance or a random variable, being independent of Ti, i = 1, . . . , n, and not
depending on our parameter vector θ. The system is observed in [0, S], where S = T ∧V .
Introduce
K = max{k|Zk < S} N =
K⋃
k=1
Hk Ni =
K⋃
k=1
Hk,i , i = 0, 1
N,N0 and N1 are the sets of components that respectively are inspected, are failed on
inspections and are functioning on inspections, up till and including the time ZK .
Our basic likelihood formula is given in Theorem 2.1, which is proved in Appendix 1.
Theorem 2.1 Let δi = I(τi < Ti < S), i ∈M ∪C. Then the complete likelihood function
for our parameter vector, θ, is given by
L(θ) =
∏
i∈M∪C
(λi(Ti))
δi
∏
i∈M∪N1
F i(Ti ∧ S)
∏
i∈N0
Fi(τi)
×{I(V > S)[I(I %= 0)λI(S)
∏
!∈AJ−(M∪N)
F!(S)
∏
!∈AcJ−(M∪N)
F !(S)
+I(I = 0)
∑
i∈CAJ−(M∪N)
λi(S)
∏
!∈AJ−(M∪N∪{i})
F!(S)
∏
!∈(AcJ∪{i})−(M∪N)
F !(S)]
+I(V = S)h(1RK ,0QK ,F (S))} .
Note that the first line in the expression for L(θ) represents the full likelihood function
up till just before system failure or censoring. The factor multiplied by I(V > S)I(I %= 0)
is the contribution to L(θ) from a system failure due to the failure of a currently monitored
component. Similarly, the factor multiplied by I(V > S)I(I = 0) is the contribution from
a system failure due to the failure of a component that is not currently being monitored.
Finally, the factor multiplied by I(V = S) is the conditional survival probability of the
system up till censoring. By setting M = C = ∅, V = ∞ noting that we then always
have I = 0, L(θ) reduces to the one given in Meilijson (1981).
3 Inspection strategies
As a background for discussing inspection strategies in general we start out from a slightly
extended Example 2.1.
Example 3.1 Consider a parallel system with E = {1, 2, 3}, M = {1}. By symmetry
we may assume C = {2} or C = {2, 3}. Let τ1 = 0, τ2 = Z∗1 = T1. The possible
inspection strategies at Z∗1 can be characterized by the corresponding possible sets Y1.
All possibilities are given in Table 2.
Case iii) is just the strategy of Example 2.1. Since after T1∨T2 the system state equals
the state of component 3, the cases i) and iii) as well as the cases ii) and iv) give the same
information.
We see from this example that two different inspection strategies may give the same
information even if one of them has fewer monitored components (cases i) and iii)) or
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Table 2. All possible inspection strategies at Z∗1 for a parallel system of three components
Case number i) ii) iii) iv)
C {2} {2, 3} {2, 3} {2, 3}
Y1 1,0 (1,1),(1,0),(0,1),(0,0) (1,−1), (0, 1), (0, 0) (1, 1), (1, 0), (0,−1)
different inspection times (cases ii) and iv)). In general consider a component, say i
(being component 3 above), known to be critical for the system at Z∗k . Then for the first
time Qk ∪ {i} is a cut set, while Qk is not. Even if i %∈ C (case i)) it may be considered as
conditionally monitored from Z∗k onwards (as in case iii)). The reason is that if component
i then later fails along with the system, this is revealed in the autopsy data, and hence
we get the same information as if i ∈ C.
Now consider the case i ∈ C. Component i may then be considered as conditionally
monitored from Z∗k onwards (as in case ii)) even if τ
∗
i > Z
∗
k (as in case iv)). Again we get
the same information since a failure of component i is anyway revealed in the autopsy
data.
It follows from these considerations that it is unnecessary to physically inspect or
monitor a component which is known to be critical for the system if the purpose of
the inspection strategy is to update the prior distributions of θ with operational data.
However, the inspection strategy may serve other purposes, e.g. recording performance
level, load or aging, and may therefore be justified.
The inspection strategy may change with time. For instance, one may in Example 3.1
switch between cases i) and ii) at fixed time points. This means that depending on T1, but
independently of the states of components 2 and 3, one inspects either only component 2
or both components 2 and 3. A way of constructing inspection strategies which generalize
such a scheme is to specify for each possible history Ek and each i ∈ Rk, a right continuous
and hence necessarily piecewise constant function HEki (t), t > Z∗k , into the set of subsets
of C − (Rk ∪Qk), and then define
Hk+1 = H
Ek
I∗k+1
(Z∗k+1) . (3.1)
It is verified in Appendix 2 that (2.3) is now satisfied. Specifying functions HEki (t) for all
possible histories might seem like an enormous task, but in practice only a few essential
features of the information in Ek may be needed. For instance, we may let Hk+1 depend
on Ek, I∗k+1 and Z∗k+1 only through (Rk − {I∗k+1}, Qk ∪ {I∗k+1}). This gives an inspection
plan of type 1, as defined in G˚asemyr (1998). Accordingly, we call a strategy based on
the more general (3.1) a history dependent inspection plan of type 1.
As a generalization of strategy iii) of Table 2, a more flexible strategy can be defined
by allowing Hk+1 to depend more extensively on information that becomes available at
Z∗k+1. We then let Hk+1 be determined through an iterative procedure involving a function
HEki (t, R,Q) into {C − R ∪ Q} ∪ {∅}, being piecewise constant and right continuous in
t > Z∗k . Here i ∈ Rk, whereas R and Q are disjoint subsets of C with Rk − {i} ⊆ R and
Qk ∪ {i} ⊆ Q.
Hk+1 is then the result of repeated applications of H
Ek
I∗k+1
(Z∗k+1, R,Q) with (R,Q) =
(Rk−{I∗k+1}, Qk∪{I∗k+1}) as initial values. For each iteration, a new component is selected
for inspection and afterwards the pair (R,Q) is updated by adding the component to R
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if it is functioning and to Q if not. This procedure is stopped when for the first time
HEkI∗k+1(Z
∗
k+1, R,Q) = ∅. We assume the procedure takes zero operational time. It is again
verified in Appendix 2 that (2.3) is satisfied.
If HEki (t, R,Q) = H(R,Q) depends on the history only through the pair (R,Q) of
components known to respectively be at risk and to have failed, H is called an inspection
function and the strategy is an inspection plan of type 2 according to the terminology in
G˚asemyr (1998). In case iii) of Table 3.1 H(∅, {1}) = {2} and H(∅, {1, 2}) = {3}.
The design of inspection plans is an important problem, which, however, will not be
discussed in depth in the present paper. One purpose may be to acquire operational
information in order to predict the future performance of the system at hand. This is
illustrated in the following example considering a history dependent inspection plan of
type 2.
Example 3.2 Assume due to scarcity of financial resources, technical equipment or per-
sonnel, it is only possible to monitor a fixed number of components at a time. Whenever
a currently monitored component fails, exactly one new component is added to the risk
set. To decide which component to start monitoring at Z∗k+1, we order the components
in C −Rk ∪Qk according to the size of the quantity
Mi(k + 1) = E[T |Bk+1 ∩ (Xi(Z∗k+1) = 1)]− E[T |Bk+1 ∩ (Xi(Z∗k+1) = 0)]. (3.2)
The components are inspected in decreasing order of Mi(k + 1) until a functioning one
is found. This component is then included in the risk set. The motivation is that a
component with larger Mi(k + 1) carries more information about the expected system
lifetime. This quantity is very much linked to the Natvig measure of importance of
components, see Natvig (1985).
For δ = 0, 1 we have
P [T > t|Bk+1 ∩ (Xi(Z∗k+1) = δ)] (3.3)
=
∫
P [T > t|Bk+1 ∩ (Xi(Z∗k+1) = δ),θ]pi(θ|Bk+1 ∩ (Xi(Z∗k+1) = δ))dθ
∝
∫
P [T > t|Bk+1 ∩ (Xi(Z∗k+1) = δ),θ)L(θ|Bk+1 ∩ (Xi(Z∗k+1) = δ))pi0(θ)dθ,
where pi(θ|Bk+1∩(Xi(Z∗k+1) = δ)) is the posterior distribution of θ. Mi(k+1) is determined
by (3.3) since
Mi(k + 1) =
∞∫
0
{P [T > t|Bk+1 ∩ (Xi(Z∗k+1) = 1)]− P [T > t|Bk+1 ∩ (Xi(Z∗k+1) = 0)]}dt .
Hence we see that the current updating of the information on θ is not just a consequence of
our monitoring scheme, but is in fact an integrated part of the scheme. The computation
ofMi(k+1) must in most cases be carried through by simulation. One starts by generating
a sample from the posterior distribution of θ by for instance rejection sampling, and then
simulates the process X(t) for given θ.
We now consider a version of an inspection plan of type 2, introduced in G˚asemyr
(1998) and called cause-controlling, which is applied in the next section when considering
preventive system maintenance. An inspection plan is cause-controlling if for k = 0, 1, . . .,
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the risk set Rk+1, arising from the whole inspection immediately after Z∗k+1, is always a
path set for the system if possible. This can be achieved by using an inspection function
H satisfying H(R,Q) %= ∅ if R is not a path set. Suppose in addition that M ∪ C = E
and that R0 =M is a path set. It is then easy to see that the system failure time T must
coincide with the failure time of a component that is currently being monitored. Hence,
the identity of the component causing system failure becomes known.
The following corollary is immediate from Theorem 2.1 since for a cause-controlling
inspection plan we always have I %= 0. In addition, the contribution h(1RK ,0QK ,F (S))
equals 1 since RK is now a path set.
Corollary 3.1 For the case of a cause-controlling inspection plan the complete likelihood
function for our parameter vector, θ, reduces to
L(θ) =
∏
i∈M∪C
(λi(Ti))
δi
∏
i∈M∪N1
F i(Ti ∧ S)
∏
i∈N0
Fi(τi)
×{I(V > S)λI(S)
∏
!∈AJ−(M∪N)
F!(S)
∏
!∈AcJ−(M∪N)
F !(S) + I(V = S)}
We conclude this section by giving another corollary following immediately from (1.1)
and Corollary 3.1
Corollary 3.2 Let θ = (θ1, . . . ,θu), u ≤ n. Suppose that for each i ∈ E there exists a
unique ri ∈ {1, . . . , u} such that Fi depends only on θri. If θ1, . . . ,θu are independent a`
priori and the likelihood function is based on data from a system monitored according to
a cause-controlling inspection plan, then θ1, . . . ,θu are independent a` posteriori as well.
4 An application to preventive system maintenance
In this section we consider preventive system maintenance where components are replaced
according to a specific strategy. We have to take into account that it is costly to intervene
in system operation. Hence, it is desirable to postpone replacement of failed components
as long as possible in order to replace several components at a time. On the other hand,
it is obviously important to avoid a system failure. As a compromise we assume that
components are replaced as soon as system weakening has reached a certain level; i.e.
when ψ(X(t)) jumps to zero, where ψ is a binary, monotone structure function such that
ψ(X(t)) ≤ φ((X(t)). At this time a total inspection of the components is carried through
and all failed components are replaced, while the others are not affected. We assume this
procedure takes zero operational time. Afterwards, the replaced components are assumed
to have the same lifetime distributions as the initial ones.
It is natural to choose ψ such that when ψ(X(t)) jumps to zero, at least one additional
component must fail for φ(X(t)) to jump to zero. If for instance φ is a k-out-of-n system,
we can choose ψ as a (k + 1)-out-of-n system. Let now φ be the structure function of
an undirected network system. How does one in general find a corresponding structure
function ψ, if it exists? The problem is solved if given the minimal path sets P1, . . . , Pp
corresponding to φ, one can find the minimal path sets corresponding to a ψ. By Menger’s
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theorem, see Bondy & Murty (1976), it can be shown formally that every path set for ψ
must contain at least two disjoint minimal path sets for φ, which is intuitively obvious.
Hence the set of minimal path sets for ψ can be chosen to be the minimal sets in {Pi ∪
Pj|Pi ∩ Pj = ∅}. This result can be extended to directed network systems by applying
the max-flow-min-cut theorem, again see Bondy & Murty (1976). An application to an
undirected network system is given in the following.
Example 4.1 Consider the network system of seven components given in Figure 1.
Figure 1. Network system of seven components
1
6
4
2
3
S T
5
7
The system is working iff there is at least one connection between S(ource) and
T(erminal). The minimal path sets of this system is obviously {1, 2}, {1, 5, 7, 4}, {6, 5, 2},
{6, 7, 4}, {3, 4}, {3, 7, 5, 2} giving the minimal path sets {1, 2, 3, 4}, {1, 2, 4, 6, 7}, {2, 3, 4, 5, 6}
of the corresponding ψ system. This leads to
ψ(x) = x2x4[x1x3 + (1− x3)x1x6x7 + (1− x1)x3x5x6]
We denote by Ti,! and Si,! respectively the time for the (th failure and replacement of
the ith component, i ∈ E, ( = 1, 2, . . . The successive times of preventive system main-
tenance are denoted T 1, T 2, . . ., and the interval (T r−1, T r] is called the rth operational
period of the system, r = 1, 2, . . . Here T 0 = 0. Formally, these variables are related as
follows. Let
Xi,1(t) = I(Ti,1 > t), i ∈ E, t > 0
X1(t) = (X1,1(t), . . . , Xn,1(t))
T 1 = inf{t > 0|ψ(X1(t)) = 0}
Xi,2(t) = I(Ti,1 > t) + I(Ti,1 ≤ T 1)I(Ti,2 > t), i ∈ E, t > T 1
X2(t) = (X1,2(t), . . . , Xn,2(t))
T 2 = inf{t > T 1|ψ(X2(t)) = 0}
...
Xi,r(t) = I(Ti,1 > t) + I(Ti,1 ≤ T r−1)I(Ti,2 > t) + · · ·
+I(Ti,r−1 ≤ T r−1)I(Ti,r > t), i ∈ E, t > T r−1
Xr(t) = (X1,r(t), . . . , Xn,r(t))
T r = inf{t > T r−1|ψ(Xr(t)) = 0}
Si,0 = 0
Si,! = min{T r, r ∈ {1, 2, . . .}|Ti,! ≤ T r}, ( = 1, 2, . . .
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The component states at time t are given by
X(t) =
∞∑
r=1
I(T r−1 < t ≤ T r)Xr(t).
Our distributional assumptions can formally be stated by introducing
Vi,! = Ti,! − Si,!−1, i ∈ E, ( = 1, 2, . . .
Then the variables Vi,! are independent and Vi,! has distribution function Fi(t).
In order to immediately register the successive times, T 1, T 2, . . ., of preventive system
maintenance, an inspection plan of type 2, which is cause-controlling with respect to ψ,
is followed. At the consecutive failure times, Z∗k , of the currently monitored components,
the risk set is updated by Hk,1, the set of conditionally lifemonitored components being
functioning on inspection, k = 1, 2, . . . If Z∗k = T
r for some r = 1, 2, . . ., a total inspection
of the components is carried through and all failed components are replaced, while the
others are not affected. We then set Rk =M .
Example 4.1 continued To have a cause-controlling inspection plan with respect to
ψ it is natural to choose M = {1, 2, 3, 4} and C = {5, 6, 7}. If either component 2 or
4 fails first, the ψ system fails and all failed components are replaced. If component 1
fails first, components 5 and 6 are inspected and if at least one of them has failed, the
ψ system has failed and all failed components are replaced. If on the other hand both
components 5 and 6 have survived, they are now monitored. Then when the first of
the components in {2, 3, 4, 5, 6} fails, the ψ system fails and all failed components are
replaced. Completely parallel, if component 3 fails first, the above procedure is still valid
by replacing components 1 and 5 with respectively 3 and 7.
For i ∈ C, r = 0, 1, 2, . . . the inspection strategy is given by inspection times τ ri defined
as follows
τ r∗i = min{Z∗k |(Z∗k > T r) ∩ (i ∈ Hk)} τ ri = τ r∗i ∧ T r+1 .
Let for i ∈ E, ( = 1, 2, . . .
Ri,! = max{r ∈ {1, 2, . . .}|T r < Si,!}
= the number of operational periods of the system before the one that ends
with the (th replacement of the ith component
τi,! =
{
0 , i ∈M
τ
Ri,!
i , i ∈ C
We want to calculate the likelihood function, L(θ), based on data from observing the
system components according to the scheme described on the interval [0, t0], where t0 is
either a fixed time point or the result of random censoring. For i ∈ E, ( = 1, 2, . . . define
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T˜i,0 = 0
T˜i,! = Ti,! ∨ τi,! = the time when the (th failure of the ith component is known
Li = max{( ∈ {0, 1, . . .}|T˜i,! ≤ t0}
= the number of known failures for the ith component before t0
δi,! = I(τi,! ≤ Ti,!)
R = max{r ∈ {1, 2, . . .}|T r ≤ t0}
= the number of operational periods of the system completed before t0
R(t0) = the risk set at t0.
For r = 0, . . . , R define kr by
Z∗kr = T
r.
Note that since Z∗0 = T
0 = 0, we have k0 = 0. Finally, let
G(R) = E −
( ⋃
{k≥kR+1|Z∗k<t0}
(Hk,0 ∪ {I∗k}) ∪R(t0)
)
= the set of components for which no information is acquired in the interval
(TR, t0].
The following theorem is proved in Appendix 1.
Theorem 4.1 The complete likelihood function for our parameter vector, θ, in the com-
ponent replacement model, where all failed components are replaced, is given by
L(θ) =
∏
i∈E
Li∏
!=1
[λi(Ti,! − Si,!−1)F i(Ti,! − Si,!−1)]δi,!
×[Fi(τi,! − Si,!−1)− Fi(TRi,! − Si,!−1)]1−δi,!
× ∏
i∈R(t0)
F i(t0 − Si,Li)
∏
i∈G(R)
F i(T
R − Si,Li).
Example 4.1 continued To illustrate Theorem 4.1 and the associated notation we
have simulated 20 exponentially distributed lifetimes for each of the components 1, . . . , 7
with expectations θ−1i , i = 1, . . . , 7 measured in hours respectively equal to 1000, 2000,
1800, 1500, 600, 800, 700. We chose t0 = 10000 hours. For i ∈ M = {1, 2, 3, 4}, δi,! = 1
and only Ti,! and Si,!−1 is needed to calculate the corresponding contribution to L(θ).
Based on the results of the simulations all relevant calculations to arrive at L(θ) are
given in Table 3.
From Table 3 we see that R = 21, L1 = 11 L2 = 3, L3 = 5, L4 = 5, L5 = 10,
L6 = 13, L7 = 11, R(t0) =M = {1, 2, 3, 4}, G(R) = C = {5, 6, 7}. Applying Theorem 4.1
straightforward calculations give
L(θ) = θ111 e
−9395θ1θ32e
−10000θ2θ53e
−9128θ3θ54e
−10000θ4
×θ25e−4497θ5(1− e−449θ5)(1− e−273θ5)(1− e−447θ5)(1− e−337θ5)(1− e−1614θ5)
×(1− e−860θ5)(1− e−1223θ5)(1− e−295θ5)
×θ6e−2904θ6(1−e−866θ6)(1− e−346θ6)(1−e−253θ6)(1−e−499θ6)(1−e−449θ6)(1−e−115θ6)
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×(1− e−337θ6)(1− e−1614θ6)(1− e−1223θ6)(1− e−284θ6)(1− e−810θ6)(1− e−295θ6)
×θ7e−3682θ7(1− e−866θ7)(1− e−346θ7)(1− e−499θ7)(1− e−449θ7)(1− e−337θ7)
×(1− e−1614θ7)(1− e−1223θ7)(1− e−284θ7)(1− e−299θ7)(1− e−396θ7) (4.1)
An alternative component replacement model is obtained if at Z∗kr , r = 1, . . . , R no
inspection of the components is carried through at all and hence only components known
to have failed are replaced. Since the system state after replacement now is at best as
good as if all failed components were replaced, more components should be monitored
suggesting that M ⊂ Rkr . We set Rkr = (Rkr−1 − I∗kr) ∪M . Define inductively
Si,0 = 0
τi,! = min{Z∗k |(Z∗k ≥ Si,!−1) ∩ (i ∈ Hk)}
Si,! = min{T r, r ∈ {1, 2, . . .}|T˜i,! ≤ T r} .
Parallel to Theorem 4.1 we now get the following theorem, which is proved in Ap-
pendix 1.
Theorem 4.2 The complete likelihood function for our parameter vector, θ, in the com-
ponent replacement model, where only components known to have failed are replaced, is
given by
L(θ) =
∏
i∈M∪C
Li∏
!=1
[λi(Ti,! − Si,!−1)F i(Ti,! − Si,!−1)]δi,!
×[Fi(τi,! − Si,!−1)]1−δi,!
∏
i∈R(t0)
F i(t0 − Si,Li).
5 Bayesian estimation of component parameters
The posterior distribution of θ given by (1.1) is the basis for Bayesian inference on com-
ponent lifetimes. A specific parameter may for instance be estimated by the expectation
in its posterior marginal distribution. When exact methods for calculating the expec-
tation are not available, one may use Markov Chain Monte Carlo simulation to obtain
approximate values. See for instance Smith & Roberts (1993).
Now assume that the lifetime of the ith component, Ti, is exponentially distributed
with failure rate θi, i ∈ E. We have θ = (θ1, . . . , θn).
The following definition of the generalized gamma distribution is given in G˚asemyr &
Natvig (1998).
Definition 5.1 For positive real numbers a, b, t1, . . . , tr define the functions
f(θ; a, b, t) = θa−1e−bθ
r∏
i=1
(1− e−θti) , θ ≥ 0
f(θ; a, b) = θa−1e−bθ , θ ≥ 0,
(5.1)
where t = (t1, . . . , tr). Define the normalizing constant γ(a, b, t) by
(γ(a, b, t))−1 = Γ(a)
∑
d∈{0,1}r
(−1)|d|(b+ d · t)−a, (5.2)
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where |d| = d1 + · · ·+ dr. The generalized gamma distribution with parameters a, b and t
is then defined as the probability distribution on [0,∞) with density function given by
g(θ; a, b, t) = γ(a, b, t)f(θ; a, b, t) , θ ≥ 0 . (5.3)
The ordinary gamma distribution, g(θ; a, b), is the special case corresponding to r = 0.
Note that conditionally on θ, the reliability function of the system can be written as
h(F (t)) =
∑
x∈{0,1}n
φ(x)
n∏
i=1
(e−θit)xi(1− e−θit)1−xi , (5.4)
by total state enumeration. This method is computationally inefficient, but will serve
the purpose to prove Theorem 5.3 to follow. In applications more efficient approaches
are needed such as for instance the technique of recursive disjoint products, see Abraham
(1979), Ball & Provan (1988) and Locks (1980, 1982). For network systems the factoring
algorithm can be very efficient, see Satyanarayana & Chang (1983).
The following lemma is obtained immediately from Theorem 2.1 using (5.4).
Lemma 5.2 For the case of exponentially distributed component lifetimes the likelihoood
function in Theorem 2.1 can be written in the form
L(θ) =
K∑
k=1
∏
i∈Bk
f(θi; 1, 0, tk,i)
∏
i∈Ck
f(θi; 1, tk,i)
∏
i∈Dk
f(θi; 2, tk,i) , (5.5)
where Bk, Ck, Dk are disjoint subsets of E for each k = 1, . . . , K.
Our main result in our Bayesian approach is the following theorem being completely
parallel to Theorem 2.2 in G˚asemyr & Natvig (1998).
Theorem 5.3 a) Suppose that the failure rates θi, i ∈ E for the components of a binary,
monotone system (E,φ) have a joint prior distribution of the form
pi(θ) ∝
J∑
j=1
n∏
i=1
f(θi; aj,i, bj,i, tj,i) =
J∑
j=1
n∏
i=1
γ(aj,i, bj,i, tj,i)
−1g(θi; aj,i, bj,i, tj,i) . (5.6)
Then the posterior distribution of θ associated with the likelihood function given by (5.5)
is of the form
pi(θ|D) ∝
J∑
j=1
K∑
k=1
[ ∏
i∈Bk
f(θi; aj,i, bj,i, tj,i, tk,i)
]
×
[ ∏
i∈Ck
f(θi; aj,i, bj,i + tk,i, tj,i)
] ∏
i∈Dk
f(θi; aj,i + 1, bj,i + tk,i, tj,i)
×
[ ∏
i∈E−(Bk∪Ck∪Dk)
f(θi; aj,i, bj,i, tj,i)
]
. (5.7)
b) The class of distributions of the form (5.6) is a conjugate class of priors for our
exponential model.
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c) Suppose the prior distribution,
pi(θ) =
n∏
i=1
g(θi; ai, bi) , (5.8)
for θ is updated with data from r independent systems with likelihood functions of the form
given by Theorem 2.1. Then the posterior distribution is of the form (5.6). If especially
the likelihood functions are of the form given by Corollary 3.1, the posterior distribution
reduces to a product of generalized gamma distributions.
Proof a) is a straightforward application of Bayes theorem. b) follows since (5.7) is of the
same general form as (5.6). c) follows by repeated use of a) remembering Corollary 3.2.
Theorem 5.3 states that the weighted sum of products of generalized gamma distribu-
tions is the conjugate prior for θ with respect to our exponential model. This seems to be
a completely new generalization of the fact that the gamma distribution is the conjugate
prior for the failure rate in an exponential model, parallel to the generalization given in
G˚asemyr & Natvig (1998). For further comments we refer to that paper and to G˚asemyr
et al. (1999) and Sørensen (1999) where simulation techniques to arrive at the posterior
distribution in the model of G˚asemyr & Natvig (1998) are given.
By considering the likelihood functions given in Theorems 4.1 and 4.2 instead of the
one given in Theorem 2.1, Theorem 5.3 is still valid. This follows since for the case of
exponentially distributed component lifetimes we have
Fi(τi,! − Si,!−1)− Fi(TRi,! − Si,!−1) =
exp(−θi(TRi,! − Si,!−1))[1− exp(−θi(τi,! − TRi,!))] .
We conclude this section by returning to Example 4.1.
Example 5.1 (example 4.1 continued) Assume that we choose the failure rates
θ1, . . . , θ7 to be independent a` priori each having an ordinary gamma distribution
g(θ; 1, 1000) with expectation and standard deviation equal to 0.001. From Corollary 3.2
and (4.1) θ1, . . . , θ7 are independent a` posteriori as well. The posterior distribution of θi is
g(θi; ai, bi), i = 1, 2, 3, 4 with (ai, bi) respectively equal to (12, 10395), (4, 11000), (6, 10128)
and (6, 11000). For i = 5, 6, 7 the posterior distribution is g(θi; ai, bi, ti) with (ai, bi, ti)
respectively equal to
(3, 5497, 449, 273, 447, 337, 1614, 860, 1223, 295) ,
(2, 3904, 866, 346, 253, 499, 449, 115, 337, 1614, 1223, 284, 810, 295)
(2, 4682, 866, 346, 499, 449, 337, 1614, 1223, 284, 299, 396)
From (5.1) and (5.3) it follows that the expected value in the g(θi; ai, bi, ti) distribution
is γ(ai, bi, ti)/γ(ai+1, bi, ti) whereas we know that it is ai/bi in the g(θi; ai, bi) distribution.
In Table 4 the correct values of θi is compared with the posterior expected values, whereas
the posterior for θ7 is plotted in Figure 2.
Table 4. Comparison of correct values of θi with posterior expectations
Component 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Correct θi 0.001 0.0005 0.00056 0.00067 0.00167 0.00125 0.00143
Posterior expectations 0.00115 0.00036 0.00059 0.00055 0.00145 0.00221 0.00171
16
Figure 2. The posterior probability density function for θ7.
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Appendix 1 Proof of theorems
Introduce
Rk(t) =
⋂
!∈Rk
(T! > t), t > Zk N
k =
k⋃
!=1
H!
Lemma A1.1 For 0 ≤ k ≤ K and t > Zk define
ρi,y,j(t;Z1, I1,Y 1, . . . , Zk, Ik,Y k)
= lim
dt→0
P [(t < Zk+1 ≤ t+ dt) ∩ (Ik+1 = i)
∩(Y k+1 = y) ∩ (Jk+1 = j)|Bk ∩ (Zk+1 > t)]/dt
= lim
dt→0
P [(t < Zk+1 ≤ t+ dt) ∩ (Ik+1 = i)
∩(Y k+1 = y) ∩ (Jk+1 = j)|Ek ∩Rk(t) ∩ (T > t)]/dt .
Then
i) for i ∈ Rk, y ∈ Yk+1
ρi,y,0(t;Z1, I1,Y 1, . . . , Zk, Ik,Y k)
= λi(t)
∏
!∈G0(y)
F!(t)
∏
!∈G1(y)
F !(t)h(1(Rk−{i})∪G1(y),0Qk∪{i}∪G0(y),F (t))/
h(1Rk ,0Qk ,F (t))
ii) for i ∈ Rk ∩ CAj where j is such that Qk ⊆ Aj, Rk − {i} ⊆ Acj
ρi,−1,j(t, Z1, I1,Y 1, . . . , Zk, Ik,Y k)
= λi(t)
∏
!∈Aj−(M∪Nk)
F!(t)
∏
!∈Acj−(M∪Nk)
F !(t)/h(1Rk ,0Qk ,F (t))
iii) for j such that Rk ⊆ Acj, Qk ⊆ Aj, CAj − (M ∪Nk) %= ∅
ρ0,−1,j(t;Z1, I1,Y 1, . . . , Zk, Ik,Y k)∑
i∈CAj−(M∪Nk)
λi(t)
∏
!∈Aj−(M∪Nk∪{i})
F!(t)
∏
!∈(Acj∪{i})−(M∪Nk)
F !(t)/h(1Rk ,0Qk ,F (t))
iv) otherwise
ρi,y,j(t;Z1, I1,Y 1, . . . , Zk, Ik,Y k) = 0
Proof i) ρi,y,0(t;Z1, I1,Y 1, . . . , Zk, Ik,Y k)
= lim
dt→0
P [(t < Ti ≤ t+ dt)∩(
⋂
!∈Rk−{i}
(T! > Ti))∩(Y ∗k+1 = y)∩(T > Ti)|Ek ∩Rk(t)]/
{P [T > t|Ek ∩Rk(t)]dt}
= λi(t) lim
dt→0
{P [ ⋂
!∈Rk−{i}
(T! > Ti)|Ek ∩Rk(t) ∩ (t < Ti ≤ t+ dt)]
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×P [Y ∗k+1 = y|Ek ∩ (t < Ti ≤ t+ dt) ∩ (
⋂
!∈Rk−{i}
(T! > Ti))]
×P [T > Ti|Ek ∩ (t < Ti ≤ t+ dt) ∩ (
⋂
!∈Rk−{i}
(T! > Ti)) ∩ (Y ∗k+1 = y)]}/
P [φ(1Rk ,0Qk ,X(t)) = 1]
By applying (2.3) the proof is completed.
ii) ρi,−1,j(t;Z1, I1,Y 1, . . . , Zk, Ik,Y k)
= lim
dt→0
P [(t < Ti ≤ t+ dt) ∩ (
⋂
!∈Rk−{i}
(T! > Ti)) ∩ (
⋂
!∈Aj−(M∪Nk)
(T! < Ti))∩
(
⋂
!∈Acj−(M∪Nk)
(T! > Ti))|Ek ∩Rk(t)]/{P [T > t|Ek ∩Rk(t)]dt}
= λi(t){ lim
dt→0
[P [
⋂
!∈Rk−{i}
(T! > Ti) ∩ (
⋂
!∈Aj−(M∪Nk)
(T! < Ti))∩
(
⋂
!∈Acj−(M∪Nk)
(T! > Ti))|Ek ∩Rk(t) ∩ (t < Ti ≤ t+ dt)]}/h(1Rk ,0Qk ,F (t)),
completing the proof.
iii) ρ0,−1,j(t;Z1, I1,Y 1, . . . , Zk, Ik,Y k)
= lim
dt→0
P [
⋃
i∈CAj−(M∪Nk)
{(t < Ti ≤ t+ dt) ∩ (
⋂
!∈Rk
(T! > Ti)) ∩ (
⋂
!∈Aj−(M∪Nk∪{i})
(T! < Ti)) ∩
(
⋂
!∈Acj−(M∪Nk)
(T! > Ti))}|Ek ∩Rk(t)]/{P [T > t|Ek ∩Rk(t)]dt} ,
completing the proof.
Proof of Theorem 2.1 For 0 ≤ k ≤ K and t > Zk we have
P (Zk+1 > t|Bk) = P [Rk(t) ∩ (T > t)|Ek ∩ (T > Zk)]
= P (Rk(t)|Ek)P [T > t|Ek ∩Rk(t)]/P (T > Zk|Ek)
=
∏
!∈Rk
(F !(t)/F !(Zk))h(1Rk ,0Qk ,F (t))/h(1Rk ,0Qk ,F (Zk)) (A1.1)
Inserting this in (2.2) with k0 = K, using case i) of Lemma A1.1 and (2.1) we obtain
L(θ|BK) =
K−1∏
k=0
{ ∏
!∈Rk
[(F !(Zk+1)/F !(Zk))h(1Rk ,0Qk ,F (Zk+1))/h(1Rk ,0Qk ,F (Zk))]
×λIk+1(Zk+1)
∏
!∈Hk+1,0
F!(Zk+1)
∏
!∈Hk+1,1
F !(Zk+1)
h(1(Rk−{Ik+1})∪Hk+1,1 ,0Qk∪{Ik+1}∪Hk+1,0 ,F (Zk+1))/h(1Rk ,0Qk ,F (Zk+1))
}
=
∏
i∈N0
Fi(τi)
K−1∏
k=0
{[ ∏
!∈Rk+1∪{Ik+1}
F !(Zk+1)
/ ∏
!∈Rk
F !(Zk)
]
λIk+1(Zk+1)
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×h(1Rk+1 ,0Qk+1 ,F (Zk+1))/h(1Rk ,0Qk ,F (Zk))
}
=
∏
i∈N0
Fi(τi)
∏
!∈RK
F !(ZK)
K−1∏
k=0
F Ik+1(Zk+1)λIk+1(Zk+1)h(1RK ,0QK ,F (ZK))
To obtain the full likelihood, we multiply this expression with the contribution from the
interval (ZK , S], which is computed by another application of (A1.1) with k replaced by
K and t by S, and by either using case ii) or iii) of Lemma A1.1 when V > S.
Proof of Theorem 4.1 The likelihood is found by linking contributions from the consec-
utive operational periods of the system. With obvious notation we then have
L(θ) = L(θ|(0, t0]) =
R−1∏
r=0
[L(θ|(T r, T r+1])]L(θ|(TR, t0]). (A1.2)
The available information at the beginning of the (r + 1)th operational period is Bkr .
Introduce the corresponding conditional distributions (r = 0, 1, . . . , R− 1)
Gri (t) = P (Xi,r+1(t) = 0|Bkr), t > T r,
with corresponding p.d.f. gri (t) and failure rate γ
r
i (t) = g
r
i (t)/G
r
i (t), i ∈ E.
Furthermore, introduce
N r0 =
⋃
kr+1≤k≤kr+1
Hk,0
= the set of components being failed on inspections in the (r+1)th opera-
tional period
NR0 =
⋃
{k≥kR+1|Z∗k<t0}
Hk,0
= the set of components being failed on inspections in (TR, t0)
Qr =
⋃
kr+1≤k≤kr+1
{I∗k}
= the set of components observed to fail in the (r+1)th operational period
QR =
⋃
{k≥kR+1|Z∗k<t0}
{I∗k}
= the set of components observed to fail in (TR, t0)
AJr+1 = {i ∈ E|Xi,r+1(T r+1) = 0}
= the fatal set corresponding to the (r + 1)th jump of ψ(X(t)) to zero
Lri = min{( ∈ {1, 2, . . .}|T r < Si,!}
= the number of renewal cycles for the ith component needed to just exceed
T r
By applying Corollary 3.1 for the case V > S with respect to ψ we get
L(θ|(T r, T r+1]) = ∏
i∈Qr
γri (Ti,Lri )
∏
i∈Qr
G
r
i (Ti,Lri )
× ∏
i∈Nr0
Gri (τi,Lri )
∏
i∈AJr+1−(Qr∪Nr0 )
Gri (T
r+1)
∏
i∈Ac
Jr+1
G
r
i (T
r+1) . (A1.3)
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Now we have
G
r
i (t) = F i(t− Si,Lri−1)/F i(T r − Si,Lri−1), t > T r
Furthermore,
τi,Lri = T
r+1 , i ∈ AJr+1 −Qr ∪N r0 .
Si,Lri−1 = Si,Lr+1i −1 , i ∈ A
c
Jr+1
Hence from (A1.3), noting that for i ∈ AJr , Si,Lri−1 = T r, we get
L(θ|(T r, T r+1]) = ∏
i∈AcJr
[F i(T
r − Si,Lri−1)]−1
× ∏
i∈Qr
λi(Ti,Lri − Si,Lri−1)
∏
i∈Qr
F i(Ti,Lri − Si,Lri−1)
× ∏
i∈AJr+1−Qr
[Fi(τi,Lri − Si,Lri−1)− Fi(T r − Si,Lri−1)]
× ∏
i∈Ac
Jr+1
F i(T
r+1 − Si,Lr+1i −1) . (A1.4)
Correspondingly, by applying Corollary 3.1 for the case V = S we get
L(θ|(TR, t0]) =
∏
i∈Ac
JR
[F i(T
R − Si,LRi −1)]−1
× ∏
i∈QR
λi(Ti,LRi − Si,LRi −1)
∏
i∈QR
F i(Ti,LRi − Si,LRi −1)
× ∏
i∈NR0
[Fi(τi,LRi − Si,LRi −1)− Fi(TR − Si,LRi −1)]
× ∏
i∈R(t0)
F i(t0 − Si,LRi −1)
∏
i∈E−(QR∪NR0 ∪R(t0))
F i(T
R − Si,LRi −1) . (A1.5)
Inserting (A1.4) and (A1.5) into (A1.2), changing the order of multiplication, we get
L(θ) =
∏
i∈E
{ R∏
r=0
[λi(Ti,Lri − Si,Lri−1)F i(Ti,Lri − Si,Lri−1)]I(i∈Q
r)
×
R−1∏
r=0
[
Fi(τi,Lri − Si,Lri−1)− Fi(T r − Si,Lri−1)
]I(i∈AJr+1−Qr)
×
[
Fi(τi,LRi − Si,LRi −1)− Fi(TR − Si,LRi −1)
]I(i∈NR0 )}
× ∏
i∈R(t0)
F i(t0 − Si,LRi −1)
∏
i∈E−(QR∪NR0 ∪R(t0))
F i(T
R − Si,LRi −1)
=
∏
i∈E
{ Li∏
!=1
[
λi(Ti,! − Si,!−1)F i(Ti,! − Si,!−1)
]I(i∈QRi,! )
×
[
Fi(τi,! − Si,!−1)− Fi(TRi,! − Si,!−1)
]I(i∈A
J
Ri,!+1
−QRi,! )I(Ri,!<R)+I(i∈NR0 )I(Ri,!=R)
}
× ∏
i∈R(t0)
F i(t0 − Si,LRi −1)
∏
i∈E−(QR∪NR0 ∪R(t0))
F i(T
R − Si,LRi −1) ,
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having used the fact that L
Ri,!
i = ( and that Li = L
R
i for i ∈ QR ∪ NR0 . By noting that
I(i ∈ QRi,!) = δi,! and I(i ∈ AJRi,!+1 −QRi,!)I(Ri,! < R) + I(i ∈ NR0 )I(Ri,! = R) = 1− δi,!
and finally that Li = LRi − 1 for i ∈ E − (QR ∪NR0 ), our proof is completed.
Proof of Theorem 4.2 The proof is very similar to the one of Theorem 4.1. We now have
G
r
i (t) =
{
F i(t− Si,Lri−1)/F i(T r − Si,Lri−1), i ∈ Rkr−1 − I∗kr , t > T r
F i(t− Si,Lri−1) , i ∈M ∪ C − (Rkr−1 − I∗kr) , t > T r
Hence, we get, noting that N r0 ⊆M ∪ C − (Rkr−1 − I∗kr)
L(θ|(T r, T r+1]) = ∏
i∈Rkr−1−I∗kr
[F i(T
r − Si,Lri−1)]−1
∏
i∈Qr
λi(Ti,Lri − Si,Lri−1)
× ∏
i∈Qr
F i(Ti,Lri − Si,Lri−1)
∏
i∈Nr0
Fi(τi,Lri − Si,Lri−1)
∏
i∈Rkr+1−1−I∗kr+1
F i(T
r+1 − Si,Lr+1i −1)
L(θ|(TR, t0]) =
∏
i∈RkR−1−I∗kR
[F i(T
R − Si,LRi −1)]−1
∏
i∈QR
λi(Ti,LRi − Si,LRi −1)
× ∏
i∈QR
F i(Ti,LRi − Si,LRi −1)
∏
i∈NR0
Fi(τi,LRi − Si,LRi −1)
∏
i∈R(t0)
F i(t0 − Si,LRi −1) ,
leading to the completion of the proof.
Appendix 2 Remarks on inspection strategies
We start by proving that condition (2.3) is satisfied, as claimed in Section 3, for two
inspection strategies considered there. We start by (3.1). Note that for any t > Z∗k and
i ∈ Rk by the piecewise constancy of HEki (·) there exists dt > 0 such that HEki (s) is
constant for s ∈ (t, t+ dt). This constant value equals Hk+1 by (3.1) if Z∗k+1 ∈ (t, t+ dt)
and I∗k+1 = i. Hence y ∈ Yk+1 implies G(y) = Hk+1. We then have for y ∈ Yk+1
lim
dt→0
P [Y ∗k+1 = y|Ek ∩ (t < Z∗k+1 ≤ t+ dt) ∩ (I∗k+1 = i)]
= lim
dt→0
P
[ ⋂
!∈G0(y)
(T! < Ti) ∩
( ⋂
!∈G1(y)
(T! > Ti)
)∣∣∣
Ek ∩ (t < Ti ≤ t+ dt) ∩
( ⋂
!∈Rk−{i}
(T! > Ti)
)]
=
∏
!∈G0(y)
F!(t)
∏
!∈G1(y)
F !(t) ,
remembering the note just after (2.3). Hence the proof is completed.
Now turn to the more flexible strategy where Hk+1 is allowed to depend more exten-
sively on information that becomes available at Z∗k+1. Again note that for any t > Z
∗
k and
i ∈ Rk there exists dt > 0 such that HEki (s, R,Q) is constant for s ∈ (t, t+ dt) for each of
the finitely many possible pairs (R,Q). Hence, by an argument similar to the one used
for (3.1), a single iteration where, say component ( is selected, contributes with a factor
(F!(t))
1−y!(F !(t))
y! . By multiplying these factors for ( ∈ G(y) we get (2.3).
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Next consider the assumption that inspections take zero operational time. This as-
sumption can be justified if the operation of the system is interrupted during the inspec-
tions and time is taken as operational time, or if the inspections actually take a negligible
amount of time compared to the lifetimes of the components. In the following example
we illustrate the possible consequences for (2.3) and Theorem 2.1 of taking into account
the times it takes to inspect each component.
Example A2.1 Let (E,φ) be a 2-out-of-6 system with M = {1} and C = {2, 3, 4, 5}.
Let εi be the time it takes to inspect component i, i = 2, . . . , 5. We construct an inspection
strategy which basically corresponds to an inspection plan of type 2 defined by an inspec-
tion function H. However, now new inspection decisions are taken consecutively by means
of H as the inspections of the individual components are completed. H is partially spec-
ified through the equations H(∅, {1}) = {2, 3}, H(∅, {1, 2}) = {4}, H(∅, {1, 3}) = {5},
H(∅, {1, 2, 3}) = {4}, H({4}, Q) = ∅ if Q = {1, 2} or {1, 2, 3}, H({5}, Q) = ∅ if Q = {1, 3}
or {1, 2, 3}. If now max{T2, T3} < T1, min{T4, T5} > T1 +max{ε2, ε3} it follows that the
result of the inspection after T1 depends on whether ε2 < ε3 or vice versa, and hence (2.3)
is not satisfied. Indeed, in the first case H1 = {2, 3, 4} and Y ∗1 = (0, 0, 1,−1) whereas in
the second case H1 = {2, 3, 5} and Y ∗1 = (0, 0,−1, 1). Of course, an ordinary inspection
plan of type 2 is obtained if one instead waits until T1+max{ε2, ε3} before a new decision
is made, now resulting in H1 = {2, 3, 4} and Y ∗1 = (0, 0, 1,−1).
If the probability that ε2 < ε3 does depend on component lifetimes or θ, which for
instance would be the case if it takes less time to inspect a failed than a functioning
component, then Theorem 2.1 is no longer valid.
24
